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Post-Brexit	immigration	policy:	Scotland	wants	to	go
its	own	way
Britain	does	not	yet	have	a	post-Brexit	immigration	policy,	and	a	likely	shortage	of	lower-skilled
workers	poses	a	particular	challenge.	Sarah	Kyambi	(University	of		Edinburgh)	looks	at	how
governments	try	to	meet	labour	shortages	and	why	Scotland	is	exploring	ways	to	encourage
migrants	to	settle	permanently.
Despite	the	likelihood	that	free	movement	will	end	when	the	UK	leaves	the	European	Union,	the
shape	of	its	future	immigration	system	is	still	perturbingly	unclear.	The	lack	of	specific	goals	for	UK
immigration	policymaking	–	beyond	bringing	the	numbers	down	and	filling	immediate	vacancies	–	is	hampering	policy
development.	A	more	systematic	approach	is	badly	needed.
Our	research	considers	both	sides	of	the	equation:	what	types	of	programmes	are	best	suited	for	particular	goals,
and	how	different	policies	would	impact	on	migrants’	decisions	to	come	to,	and	remain	in,	the	UK.
Since	free	movement	has	been	the	sole	entry	route	for	labour	migration	into	lower-skilled	jobs,	low	skilled,	low	paid
jobs	are	likely	to	be	hardest	hit	by	Brexit.	A	growing	number	of	reports	address	the	potential	impacts	on	particular
sectors	and	occupations,		and	shortages	are	predicted	in	areas	like	social	care,	agriculture,	food	processing	and
hospitality.
Scottish	external	affairs	secretary	Fiona	Hyslop	launches	a	campaign	in	April	2018	to	promote
the	country	abroad.	Photo:	Scottish	Government	via	a	CC-BY-NC	2.0	licence
However,	proposals	for	immigration	into	lower	skilled	jobs	after	Brexit	are	few	and	will	probably	be	confined	to	short-
term,	possibly	sectoral,	schemes	with	restrictive	conditions	that	require	migrants	to	leave	the	UK	at	the	end	of	their
stay.	This	is	in	marked	contrast	to	the	open-ended	flexibility	provided	by	free	movement,	which	offers	access	to
benefits,	generous	family	rights	and,	eventually,	access	to	permanent	status	for	those	coming	to	work.	This	makes	it
all	the	more	important	for	post-Brexit	immigration	policy	to	consider	the	full	range	of	options	and	factors	at	work.
We	identified	three	types	of	immigration	programme:
Sectoral	schemes,	which	recruit	workers	to	particular	sectors	or	occupations	to	address	specific	sectoral	or
occupational	shortages.
Employer-led	schemes,	which	select	workers	based	on	employer	demand	and	assume	that	employers	are	best
placed	to	identify	shortages.
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Human	capital	schemes,	which	select	workers	based	on	their	individual	characteristics,	such	as	work
experience,	family	status,	language	skills	or	ties	with	the	country/region.
Looking	at	six	case	studies	in	industrialised	countries,	we	found	that	the	generosity	of	these	schemes	depends	on
their	aims,	the	difficulty	of	attracting	migrants	and	the	social,	economic	and	political	context	underlying	social	norms.
Temporary,	restrictive	schemes	for	migration	into	lower	skilled	work	are	widespread,	but	other	types	of	programme
exist.	Many	balanced	a	range	of	competing	and	complementary	aims,	some	more	successfully	than	others.
Countries	who	want	migrants	to	settle	generally	have	to	offer	more	generous	conditions.		Mechanisms	that	target
migrant	labour	to	specific	locations	or	occupations,	such	as	tied	visas,	increase	the	risk	of	exploitation	which	calls	for
increased	safeguarding.	Migrants	themselves	trade	off	working	at	a	level	matching	their	skills	and	qualifications	for
the	opportunity	to	access	more	generous	programmes:	pathways	to	permanent	settlement	can	mean	deskilling.
At	present,	we	are	awaiting	the	Migration	Advisory	Committee’s	final	report	on	the	role	of	EEA	workers	in	the	UK’s
economy.	This	is	expected	to	provide	a	clearer	picture	of	labour	shortages,	and	whether	the	resident	population
benefits	if	migrants	are	recruited	to	fill	them.	While	this	will	give	a	clearer	picture	–	particularly	of	economic	needs	–	it
risks	applying	too	narrow	a	conception	of	the	goals	to	be	pursued.		The	Scottish	Government,	for	example,	has	been
vocal	about	seeking	a	wider	range	of	immigration	goals,	such	as	averting	population	decline,	offsetting	population
ageing	and	sustaining	remoter	communities.	Short-term,	sectoral	schemes	are	least	well	suited	to	meeting	these
aims	and	likely	to	generate	extraneous	problems,	given	the	level	of	population	churn	involved.
At	the	SNP	conference	First	Minister	Nicola	Sturgeon	made	clear	that	Scotland	remains	committed	to	attracting
migrants.	Our	research	with	EEA	migrants	in	Scotland	showed	that	a	more	restrictive	regime	would	certainly	impact
migrants’	settlement	decisions,	although	younger,	unattached	migrants	would	not	necessarily	be	put	off	from	coming
to	the	UK	in	the	first	instance.	Access	to	family	and	welfare	rights,	the	opportunity	to	extend	their	stay	and	settle
permanently,	the	ability	to	change	jobs	and	move	within	the	UK	all	matter,	particularly	for	longer-term	stay	and
settlement.	This	chimes	with	international	practice,	where	programmes	that	recruit	migrants	for	the	longer	term	go
hand-in-hand	with	more	generous	provisions.
We	found	that	increased	restrictions	and	barriers	to	entry	would	prompt	EEA	nationals	to	consider	their	options
elsewhere,	within	other	EEA	countries,	but	also	in	other	English-language	destinations	such	as	Canada	and	the
USA.	It	is	vital	that	considerations	of	the	UK’s	future	immigration	regime	looks	at	the	impacts	of	proposed	rules	on
migrants’	decisions,	an	aspect	often	neglected.
Finally,	as	immigration	policy	in	the	UK	and	Scotland	diverges,	we	need	to	give	serious	thought	to	the	options	for	a
differentiated	system	that	lets	regions	pursue	different	goals.	Despite	many	calls	for	greater	regionalisation	in	this
area,	the	Migration	Advisory	Committee	interim	report	appears	to	indicate	that	it	is	unlikely	to	support	it,	as	it	cannot
find	sufficient	variation	in	regional	labour	markets.	However,	this	fails	to	take	into	account	the	strong	desire	in
Scottish	politics	to	do	things	differently	on	immigration,	and	the	reasons	and	goals	underpinning	it.	A	system	that
cannot	accommodate	a	fuller	consideration	of	immigration	goals,	and	how	best	to	meet	them,	will	chafe.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	
Dr	Sarah	Kyambi	is	an	expert	on	immigration	and	integration	policy.	She	provides	policy-relevant	research	and
strategic	input	for	government,	funders	and	NGOs	and	is	affiliated	with	the	University	of	Edinburgh.	She	is	co-author
of	the	ESRC-funded	Choices	Ahead:	Approaches	to	Lower	Skilled	Labour	Migration	After	Brexit	(June	2018).
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